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Figure 1. Countries with UEMS: January 1979 to August 2017.
Courtesy of Small Arms Survey.

P

oor management of government stockpiles of small arms
and ammunition poses significant safety and security concerns—both for the country in question and often for its
neighbors. Challenges to safety are readily apparent by the frequent
occurrence and consequences of unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS). Security shortcomings include oversight limitations that facilitate corrupt practices and seizures of state materiel
by armed groups that undercut a state’s legitimate use of force, and
undermine good governance and the rule of law.
The Small Arms Survey (hereafter referred to as the Survey)
actively contributes to efforts to promote physical security and
stockpile management (PSSM) and life-cycle management of
ammunition (LCMA), and works with—and benefits from—
practitioners and policy makers focusing on these agendas.1 The
development of the Survey’s UEMS-related research, for example,
was made possible in large part by the active engagement of the
Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG)
and the financial support of the Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs (PM/WRA). 2 The Survey also works closely with
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) in support of the Swiss Safe and Secure Management
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of Ammunition (SSMA) Initiative and other joint efforts, such as
the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affair’s (UNODA's)
SaferGuard program to promote the International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines (IATG). Survey databases and tools are
frequently used to develop national capacities and to raise
awareness among decision makers on the importance of adequately
funding and meaningfully improving PSSM and LCMA practices.

Update on Existing Tools and Reference Materials
Long-term readers of The Journal of Conventional Weapons
Destruction will remember the Survey’s efforts to develop its UEMS
Database. 3 Early data collection efforts resulted in the identification of over 400 UEMS incidents in more than 90 countries between
1979 and 2011. The UEMS Database has since evolved, both in terms
of the number of incidents entered and the additional data recorded for specific events. As of August 2017, the number of UEMS incidents since 1979 totaled 567. UEMS have occurred in (at least)
101 countries on every continent except Antarctica (see Figure 1).
The database includes fields on causation, casualties suffered, type
of site, ownership, tonnage lost, and some 50 other criteria. This
data provides a basis for analysis to allow for greater insight into
the human, financial, and political costs associated with improper

ammunition management as well as an evidence base to support good practice.
The UEMS Database has led to the development of two concrete tools aimed at
understanding and mitigating the safety and security risks that improperly managed ammunition stockpiles pose: the
UEMS Handbook and the UEMS Incident
Reporting Template (IRT). The Survey’s 2014
UEMS Handbook, which covers the period
1979–2013, provides a comprehensive overview of UEMS. Each incident recorded in the
UEMS Database at the time is listed by country within regions, as well as chronologically for ease of reference. The publication also Figure 2. The Survey’s PSSM Best Practice Cards.
includes the Survey’s popular PSSM Best
A challenge facing the Survey is how to ensure that this tool is fully
Practice Cards (see Figure 2), which also exist as playing cards.4
exploited to develop national capacities and good practice. It would
Other features of the handbook include an analysis of these incialso be useful to more fully generate, collate, and verify crucial indents’ scale and scope (e.g., their causes, numbers, and effects), an
formation about UEMS, which can then better inform on the risks
annotated bibliography and review of various guidelines, studassociated with ammunition management.
ies, and tools, and short overviews of some three dozen actors
Even with existing challenges and limitations, the UEMS
(e.g., the U.N. bodies and agencies, regional organizations, nonDatabase allows for important policy-relevant and agenda-setting
governmental organizations, and private companies) working to reanalyses. For instance, almost one in six incidents involve muniduce the threat poorly-managed munitions sites and surplus amtions stockpiles owned or managed by private companies or nonmunition pose to people’s safety and security. The handbook also
state armed groups. This raises important questions about the
includes the UEMS IRT.
adequacy of government oversight regarding the former, and
Despite important progress made in developing and strengthabout the utility of donor support to perhaps enhance some sites
ening the database, data-collection challenges remain. To a large
of the latter. Casualties suffered from explosions vary considerextent, the UEMS database depends on open-source informaably, suggesting that while it is not possible to completely stop
tion, such as media reports or other public documents. Although
incidents from happening, the implementation of good safety praca useful source of information, such documents may be limited
tices (like those found in the IATG) can significantly reduce such
in terms of the amount of detail provided regarding the circumincidents’ ramifications.7
stances of the UEMS incident. Official investigative reports are
One clear trend that defies easy analysis is the steep downturn in
often confidential due to potential legal liability concerns or to
the number of UEMS recorded over the past five years (see Figure
save face in light of improper ammunition management prac4). The rise of social media and global interconnectivity since the
tices. Consequently, there is a dearth of information in open
late 1990s might partly explain the relatively small number of resource reports, resulting in a paucity of detail surrounding cercorded UEMS in the 1980s. If media and donor interest in this
tain UEMS incidents.
phenomenon has not diminished (and if the technology to report
In an effort to address the data gaps related to UEMS, and to
them has been constant), then the fall in the recorded number of
provide states with a framework for investigating and reporting
incidents seems genuine. What explains this? More resources?
on incidents, the Survey created the UEMS IRT (see Figure 3). This
tool exists in Arabic, Bosnian-CroatianMontenegrin-Serbian (BCMS), English,
French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and
Swahili. The template addresses six UEMSrelated questions:
• When did the UEMS incident occur?
• Where did the UEMS incident occur?
• Who owns the site and the contents
on it?
• Why did the UEMS incident occur?
• What happened as a result of the
explosion?
• How did the state and the international community respond?
The Survey continuously updates the
UEMS Database and developed the UEMS
IRT to assist in this process. 5 The Survey
knows that this tool is in considerable demand from the more than 10,000 times it has
been downloaded from the Survey’s website.6 Figure 3. (part of) the Survey’s UEMS IRT.
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Greater expertise? Better decision making?
A reduction in problematic stockpiles due
to the spate of explosions in the first decade
or so of the 2000s? Transfers and consumption of large quantities of surplus ammunition to meet increased demand due to
the growing number of armed conflicts?
The Survey plans to address these policyrelevant questions by developing and implementing a number of related projects in
the coming years. Two illustrative examples include the LCMA Handbook and the
Making Peace Operations More Effective
(MPOME) Project.
The nine Southeast European countries Figure 4. UEMS by Year, January 1979 to August 2017 (data for 2017 only covers eight months).
participating in the Regional Approach to
Stockpile Reduction (RASR) Initiative,
which the Survey has been privileged to
help support, have acknowledged that they
possess surpluses and can improve on their
current practices.8 Indeed, nearly 10 percent of the UEMS recorded since 1979 in
the Survey’s database have occurred in six
of the nine RASR-participating states. The
governments have sought to mitigate the
risk of incidents by (among other things)
destroying hundreds of thousands of tons of
excess munitions. Some munitions destined
for destruction have crossed state lines for
destruction in neighboring states’ facilities,
safely and in an environmentally acceptable
manner. Experience shows, however, that
progress toward reducing surplus is not a
foregone conclusion and often occurs in fits
and starts.9 Sales remain the favored mode
of disposal for most governments, and recent unplanned explosions in that region
suggest that existing practices can still be
improved and that the need to reduce surplus remains a pressing challenge.
Governments in Southeast Europe and
elsewhere often lack the financial resources
Figure 5. The Survey’s PSSM Priorities Matrix.
to address the challenges posed by their ammunition and weapon stockpiles, and are often daunted by the leg- work. The Survey is committed to developing its UEMS Database
islative, logistical, and technical requirements. They often request and utilizing its UEMS IRT more effectively. Resources permitting,
international cooperation to address these challenges. However, the the intention is to provide a 2nd Edition of the UEMS Handbook in
rationale for and full extent of the sought-after assistance is often not 2019. An edition of the popular PSSM Best Practice Cards with a
well described, leaving donors unwilling to support programs and LCMA focus is being developed, and the RASR effort will contininitiatives that are not clearly explained and that do not lead to con- ue with new guidance from the latest RASR Workshop (held 3–4
crete outputs. To assist states to manage their stocks and reduce their October in Podgorica, Montenegro).
surpluses safely, securely, and economically, the Survey in 2016 creIn light of the recent international shift in focus from immediate
ated a PSSM Priorities Matrix (see Figure 5). This tool helps states
risk reduction toward a more comprehensive approach to weapons
prioritize their stockpile management needs and articulate those
and ammunition management, the Survey has embarked on two
needs to the donor community. Importantly, it moves states away
initiatives that merit special mention: the LCMA Handbook and
from a wish list approach of asking donors for anything that might
the MPOME Project.
stick to a more constructive discourse. Similarly, the objective is to
The forthcoming LCMA Handbook is part of the Survey’s sushave donors reduce the likelihood for duplicating efforts.10
tained efforts toward highlighting the importance and challenges of addressing ammunition fully across its life cycle, meaning
Overview of Ongoing and Upcoming Projects
All of the previously-mentioned projects undertaken during the cradle-to-grave. Geared to non-technical audiences (especially depast five years remain important elements of the Survey’s ongoing cision makers and donors), the LCMA Handbook elaborates on the
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Figure 6. The Survey’s LCMA Model.

aspects required for the effective incorporation of the IATG at the
national level. Indeed, one of the components of the handbook—
a summary of the IATG’s more than 40 modules—will be made
available as a stand-alone output and featured on the United Nation
Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website. As anticipated,
the full study will be published in both English and French. As a
first step, the Survey will work with MSAG, UNODA, and other
partners, to make the IATG summary available in the four other
official U.N. languages (Arabic, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish).
The centerpiece of the Handbook consists of an LCMA Model that
comprises four main elements: planning, procurement, management, and disposal (see Figure 6). The Handbook takes advantage
of a case study on the experience of establishing an LCMA system
in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
will incorporate examples of challenges and
good practice from across the globe.
The MPOME Project focuses on improving
management practices of small arms and ammunition within peace operations. Between
2013 and 2015, the Survey developed its Peace
Operations Data Set (PODS) that recorded attacks on peacekeepers in numerous missions
in Sudan and South Sudan, and documented
the loss of lethal material. In October 2017, we
released a study on attacks on peacekeepers
Figure 7. A Survey publica- not limited to missions in those two countries,
tion supporting the MPOME “Making a Tough Job more Difficult: Loss of
Project.
Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations”
(see Figure 7).11 The report shows that the scale and scope of losses of contingent-owned equipment (COE) in peace operations is
greater than appreciated, and that improved practices could reduce
the amount of materiel lost, and enhance a mission’s force protection posture and its ability to implement its mandate. The MPOME
Project, which commenced in December 2016, builds on this work;
it has four components. One concerns a series of regional workshops that will allow practitioners in peace operations to share
their experiences and, in so doing, chip away at the perceived taboo that such matters are too sensitive to discuss. A second element
involves working with actors undertaking peace operations to develop countermeasures to better manage COE as well as recovered
materiel in peace operations. For example, the Survey will work
with the African Union to develop guidelines or standard operating

procedures (SOPs) for the latter. A third component calls for the Survey to work bilaterally with
states to learn how their peace operations training
and oversight procedures have changed over the
years to better manage COE and recovered materiel, and work with them to further improve on current practice. Lastly, the MPOME Project provides
for outreach efforts to explore additional partnerships and share the results of the various initiatives
mentioned above. The initial phase of this project
runs through March 2019.
Despite the significant progress that has been
made in reducing the risk to safety and security
posed by unsafe surplus materiel and in securing
stockpiles, much more can be done. The potential
policy and programming utilities of the UEMS
Database and IRT remain underutilized. Other existing tools, such as the more recent PSSM
Priorities Matrix and forthcoming resources, including the LCMA Handbook, will be more valuable with examples
of challenges states and implementing bodies have encountered as
well as of good practice. Many countries still view excess stockpiles
as assets rather than liabilities, regardless of the conditions of their
facilities and their ammunition or the questionable market for their
wares. Moreover, many countries that would be willing to part with
their excess and often aged materiel possess neither the know-how
nor the resources to act appropriately (e.g., proper testing or improved storage). The Survey looks forward to continuing to work
with states, practitioners, and donors at national, regional, and international levels to develop and promote tools and analyses to promote safe and secure storage and handling of ammunition, thereby
reducing illicit proliferation of lethal material and incidents of
armed violence.
See endnotes pag 66
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Endnotes
Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic
materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines
or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase
Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments
will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or
whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs
and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items
or components explosive in nature.
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure
or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes
mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty.
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ elements of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and Keeley,
2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C.
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 2017.
http://bit.ly/2weqsLy.
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://bit.
ly/1wPPgSM.
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. Bonn:
BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC Working
paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory
Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together
to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 (2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese,
Russian, Spanish, and Swahili.
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while casualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100
other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European
Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World (2015):
125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11. Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva: Small Arms
Survey, 2017.
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